Introduction
We investigate whether investors use information about the liquidation prices of the rm's assets to value their option to abandon the continuing business in exchange for the assets' liquidation value. As uncertainty about future cash ows is resolved, investors may wish to exercise their option to abandon the rm for its liquidation value. This abandonment option is like owning an insurance policy that pays o if the rm performs below expectations. The option thus has value, and information about the liquidation value of the rm's assets should a ect its market value.
One area our study contributes to is the real options literature. This body of research recognizes that investment decisions often involve choices about a variety of control opportunities, such as when to invest (McDonald and Siegel (1986) , Majd and Pindyck (1987) , Lee (1988) , and Pindyck (1988) ), how to modify operating plans during a project's life (Stulz (1982) , Johnson (1987) , Kensinger (1988) , and Triantis and Hodder (1990) ), and whether to abandon an investment in midstream (Robichek and Van Horne (1967) , Bonini (1977) , Kensinger (1980) , and Myers and Majd (1990) ). Despite the theoretical development of real option-pricing models for these and other embedded options, almost no research has examined the models' empirical implications. Two exceptions are Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) , and Quigg (1993) , which both examine the e ect of the option to wait on the price of a speci c capital investment (o shore oil leases or land). In contrast, our paper tests empirical implications of abandonment option-pricing models on the price of the entire rm.
Our paper also contributes to the large body of accounting research that aims to identify value-relevant accounting attributes. Most of this research has explored the relation between income statement disclosures and stock prices. Relatively little evidence exists, however, on the role played by the balance sheet in assessing rm value. Foster (1986, p.446) states that \one area of equity valuation where important unresolved questions exist is the link between the level of equity security prices and the values of the individual assets and liabilities owned or controlled by the rm." Recently, a number of theoretical and empirical papers have addressed the valuation e ects of balance sheet items. Most of these papers examine the potential for balance sheet disclosures to provide incremental information about the expected level of future going-concern cash ows (see, for example, Ohlson (1991) , and Penman (1992) ). Our examination of the abandonment option's e ect on rm value di ers from these papers by assessing the extent to which balance sheet information a ects rm value given the level of expected going-concern cash ows.
The abandonment option is equivalent to an \American" put option on a dividend-paying stock. Our analysis of this option leads to predictions about how liquidation value a ects rm value. All else equal, the abandonment option results in rms with a greater liquidation value being worth more to investors. We therefore predict that market value is positively related to liquidation value, after controlling for the relation between market value and the present value of expected cash ows (PVCF).
Liquidation values for going concerns are generally unobservable. Moreover, we are interested in the association between balance sheet information and the abandonment option's value. Therefore, we estimate the relation between book value and liquidation value for major asset classes by using the discontinued operations footnotes of 157 rms with su ciently detailed information. We nd that a dollar's book value produces, on average, 72 cents of liquidation value for receivables, 55 cents for inventory, and 54 cents for xed assets. Applying these estimates to the balance sheet disclosures of each rm in the full sample provides us with estimated liquidation values.
We use discounted analysts' forecasts of future earnings as proxies for PVCF. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) nd that, for a sample of 52 highly levered transactions, rm value estimates based on discounted cash ow forecasts consistently outperform those based on industry-median cash ow multipliers.
We nd a positive and highly signi cant relation between market value and estimated liquidation value after controlling for PVCF. This relation holds across each year in the [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] sample period, and after controlling for factors that a ect market value and that may not be completely captured by the PVCF proxy. Further assurance that correlated omitted variables do not drive the results is provided by the fact that the positive relation between liquidation and market values holds in changes as well as levels.
Option pricing theory suggests that the abandonment option's value is increased more by less specialized assets because their value is less correlated with PVCF. Thus, if PVCF becomes disappointing, the value of the rm's generalizable assets will not decline as much as the value of its specialized assets. We nd support for the prediction that less specialized assets produce more abandonment option value. We nd that a dollar's book value of current assets adds more market value than a dollar's book value of xed assets. Noninventory current assets create more value than inventory and land enhances the option's value more than other xed assets.
Finally, the probability of the abandonment option being exercised may be a function of variables other than PVCF and liquidation value, such as the probability of nancial distress and the likelihood of managers (who control the option's exercise) delaying abandonment past the time that is optimal for the rm's investors. Variation around a given level of liquidation value has greater e ect on market value when the probability of the option being exercised is higher. Consistent with this prediction, we nd that rms with higher probabilities of either nancial distress (as measured by the inverse of Altman's (1968) Zscore) or timely abandonment have market values that are more sensitive to variation in estimated liquidation values.
Section 2 describes abandonment put option theory and develops our predictions. Section 3 describes the estimation of liquidation values, details the construction of PVCF from discounted analysts' forecasts, and presents the sample selection and description. Section 4 describes the empirical tests and results, and section 5 provides our summary and conclusions.
The appendix presents additional details on variable construction.
Theory and Predictions
In the capital budgeting literature, the abandonment option has been discussed for over 25 years. 1 Robichek and VanHorne (1967) include it as a contingency in the forecast of cash ows used for calculating the net present value or internal rate of return of an investment project.
Their contingency approach (as corrected by Dyl and Long (1969) ) does not, however, provide a practical procedure for calculating the abandonment option's value, motivating attempts to model the option's value directly. Kensinger (1980) does this, but his analysis assumes the option is \European" and has a nonstochastic exercise price. Myers and Majd (1990) improve on Kensinger's approach by recognizing that the abandonment option is equivalent to a complex \American" put with both an uncertain underlying stock value (the cash ows) and an uncertain exercise price (the liquidation value).
Beginning with the intuition provided by Myers and Majd, we develop our hypotheses on the relation between rm value and the rm characteristics that determine the abandonment option's value. The hypotheses are explained with reference to the following equations:
( VALUE PVCF
where:
1 The option to liquidate has recently received attention in the accounting literature as well. Burgstahler and Dichev (1994) and Hayn (1994) address how the likelihood of liquidations or other redeployments of rm assets may a ect the relation between accounting numbers and rm value. VALUE = the rm's market value PVCF = the present value of the rm's expected operating cash ows P = an operator representing an American put option SALVAGE= the liquidation value of the rm's assets SDEV = the standard deviation of the ratio of PVCF over SALVAGE Equation 1 shows that the rm's market value equals the sum of the value of its expected operating cash ows plus the value of the abandonment option. Note that the abandonment option need not represent liquidation of the entire rm. The option to liquidate subsets of the rm's assets, such as lines of business, is also of value to investors. 2 When we divide each term of equation 1 by PVCF and rearrange terms in equation 2, the result is an expression of abandonment option value (the percentage by which rm value exceeds PVCF) as a function of the option's parameters. We present the relation in this form because it facilitates hypothesis development. As Myers and Majd point out, a general speci cation of the abandonment option does not allow a closed-form solution. The empirical tests therefore address only the relations suggested by equation 2, rather than an exact functional form.
The value of the option is a function of the ratio of SALVAGE to PVCF, which we call excess liquidation value. Equation 2 shows that excess liquidation value may be viewed as the stochastic strike price of a put option with a normalized value of one on its underlying stock. When excess liquidation value equals one (i.e., liquidation value equals the value of expected cash ows), the abandonment option is at the money. As the liquidation value increases, the option moves further into the money, whereas when the value of expected cash ow increases, the option moves further out of the money. Thus, excess liquidation value is positively related to abandonment option value.
Abandonment option theory gives rise to the prediction that, for a given current value of assets, more abandonment option value is created when the assets are less specialized. Ronen and Sorter (1973) and Williamson (1988) argue that, when the rm's cash ows become disappointing, redeployable assets can be liquidated for relatively high values. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) contend that the reason specialized assets are more likely to drop in value is because, when the seller's cash ows are disappointing, potential buyers are themselves likely to be experiencing problems. Myers and Majd (1990) This analysis implies that, given current asset value and PVCF, market value decreases with asset specialization. The current value of the rm's assets is unobservable, and we are interested in how investors use book values to price their abandonment option. We therefore test whether market value decreases with asset specialization after holding constant PVCF and book value of assets. The potential e ects on our inferences of using book values to proxy current values are discussed with the empirical results. To categorize assets by degree of specialization, we follow Ronen and Sorter (1973) in classifying current assets as less specialized than xed assets, non-inventory current assets as less specialized than inventory, and land as less specialized than other xed assets. These classi cations enjoy wide acceptance in both the literature on liquidation values and in nancial accounting. 3 Abandonment option theory shows that, for given levels of PVCF and liquidation value, market value is more sensitive to variation in liquidation value when the probability of the option being exercised is higher. We propose two factors that could a ect investors' assessment of the probability of exercise: the likelihood of nancial distress, and the level of agency problems between investors and managers. Financial distress can force liquidation of the rm. We therefore predict that rm's with higher nancial distress probabilities have market values that are more sensitive to variation in estimated liquidation values.
Although investors hold the abandonment option, they may be unable to e ect exercise when they desire due to agency problems with the managers who control the abandonment decision. For example, Ofek (1993) nds results consistent with entrenched managers being more likely to avoid taking actions such as discontinuing operations when the rm becomes distressed. If variation in agency problems results in some managers being more likely to delay liquidation past the optimal time for investors, investors will value the option more highly when the probability of delayed exercise is lower. We therefore predict that rm value is more sensitive to variation around a given excess liquidation value when investors attach a higher probability to timely exercise of the option. Our nal predictions are for the bounds of the relation between excess liquidation value and abandonment option value. If there is no probability that the abandonment option will be exercised, information about liquidation value has no e ect on rm value and the slope of the relation is at its lower bound of zero. At the other extreme, when the abandonment option is certain to be exercised, an extra dollar of liquidation value increases rm value by one dollar.
Empirical Approach

Estimating Liquidation Values
The salvage value of a rm's assets is not observable, whereas the book value is. We therefore use rms with discontinued operations to estimate how many cents per dollar of book value each of three major asset classi cations produces when liquidated. We then apply these estimates to all sample rms to construct the excess liquidation value variable.
We obtain the information about discontinued operations from the NAARS library of Lexis/Nexis using the search \discop w/seg (write-down or write-o )" for the years 1984-93, which produces 1,043 observations. The phrases write-down and write-o are used in an attempt to restrict the liquidations identi ed to cases in which the motive for sale is to abandon operations whose cash ows have become disappointing. Observations are retained if information is available on the discontinued segment's book value, its liquidation value, and the proportion of its book value in noninventory current assets, inventory, and xed assets. In addition, the assets of the discontinued line of business must be sold to unrelated parties. These requirements result in a sample of 157 observations.
The regression we perform on this sample and the estimation results are as follows: LIQBOOK i = the ratio of liquidation value to book value for rm i's discontinued operations NONINV i = the proportion of book value in noninventory current assets for rm i's discontinued operations INV i = the proportion of book value in inventory for rm i's discontinued operations FIXED i = the proportion of book value in xed assets for rm i's discontinued operations The regression is performed with no intercept because, by construction, the independent variables sum to one. The estimates show how many cents per dollar of book value each asset category produces in liquidation. Noninventory current assets are liquidated for 72 cents on the dollar, inventory for 55 cents, and xed assets for 54 cents.
Book value of equity is transformed into estimated liquidation value of equity as follows.
For each sample rm, we multiply each of the three components of book value (non-inventory current assets, inventory, and xed assets) by the estimated liquidation value per dollar of book value, and subtract the book values of payables and debt. Note that the cash and shortterm marketable securities components within the non-inventory current assets category are multiplied by one rather than by 0.72.
Proxies for the Present Value of Cash Flows
We use analysts' earnings forecasts to calculate the PVCF proxy. The fact that analysts are forecasting earnings, rather than distributable cash ows, o ers both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that, because accountants measure going-concern earnings, a PVCF proxy based on forecasts of these earnings does not incorporate the abandonment option's value. If analysts' were instead forecasting distributable cash ows, their forecasts presumably would incorporate cash ows expected from non-going concern events (i.e., liquidations). The shortcoming is that earnings di er from cash ows, so that the present value of going-concern earnings needs to be adjusted to obtain the present value of goingconcern cash-ows. Adjustments must be made because capital expenditures may not equal depreciation, and growth in working capital is not subtracted from earnings. An adjustment for capital structure changes is not required because we assume that such changes are not foreseeable. (3) where: PVCF = the present value of analysts' predicted going-concern cash ows EARN t = the analyst forecast of year t after-interest earnings r = the expected CAPM return, described below gr = the consensus forecast of ve-year earnings growth tg = the terminal growth rate of earnings n = the number of years for which earnings are forecast t = the year index CAPEX ADJUST= a reduction to the present value of analysts' earnings forecasts to adjust for the di erence between capital expenditures and depreciation WC ADJUST = a reduction to the present value of analysts' earnings forecasts to adjust for growth in working capital
The expected CAPM return is de ned as:
where r f is the risk free rate, e is the rm's beta or systematic risk (from the CRSP beta le), and r m ? r f is the risk premium of the stock market over the risk-free rate. In implementing equation 4, we assume that the relevant investment horizon is short term and therefore use the one-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate and a risk premium of 8.67% (the arithmetic average spread from 1926 to 1991 between the return on the S&P 500 and the return on Treasury bills).
As equation 3 shows, the analyst forecast approach uses ve components to proxy for the present value of after-interest cash ows. First, expected earnings from analysts' forecasts are discounted and summed. These forecasts are available for at least two years for all sample rms. The second term projects earnings for the period from the last forecast earnings through year ten using analysts' consensus long-term ( ve-year) earnings growth forecast, then discounts and sums these expected in ows. 4 The third term calculates the present value of the perpetuity for the earnings from year 11 forward by assuming a constant 4% nominal terminal growth rate applies for all observations. 5 The fourth term subtracts the present value of the excess of future capital expenditures minus future depreciation. This adjustment for future`excess' capital expenditures is needed because analysts' are forecasting earnings, not distributable cash ows, and earnings growth typically requires capital investment in excess of depreciation charges. The details of the excess capital expenditures adjustment are provided below. The fth term makes a similar subtraction for the present value of working capital growth, and its calculation is also detailed below.
Because we start from forecast earnings to calculate discounted cash ows, we adjust for future excess capital expenditures, which are a major source of the di erence between future earnings and future cash ows. Forecasts of excess capital expenditures are, however, unavailable. We could attempt to develop our own forecasts from historical gures, but, for extreme values, historical variation in excess capital expenditures tends to overstate future variation. The rank order of historical excess capital expenditures is, however, a good predictor of the rank order for future excess capital expenditures. 6 Therefore, we adjust each future years' earnings by a xed percentage that depends on the decile ranking of the historical level of excess capital expenditures. The decile rankings are based on the ratio of the sum of capital expenditures to the sum of depreciation expense, with the sums calculated using those observations within the most recent three years that have available information.
5 Three factors lead us to project rm-speci c growth for ten years. First, although the earnings growth forecasts we have are for ve-year growth, it seems unrealistic to assume that earnings growth moves immediately from its rm-speci c rate to a terminal rate in year six. Second, ten is the most common number of years for the management cash ow forecasts of the 52 rms studied by Kaplan and Ruback (1995) . Third, we compared the PVCF gures that result from projecting rm-speci c growth for ve, ten, 15, and 20 years and found that ten years performed best in terms of minimizing the variance of the log of the ratio of equity value to PVCF. Minimizing this variance is a desirable feature for the PVCF proxy, because true PVCF is presumably quite close to equity value for most rms. With respect to the 4% terminal growth rate, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) present results using nominal growth rates of 4%, 2%, and 0%, but state that they feel \the 4% rate is economically the most appropriate."
6 Using 20 years of Compustat data we nd that rms with relatively high (low) excess capital expenditures in a given year have an increased likelihood of having relatively high (low) excess capital expenditures the following year, and an increased likelihood of having a more negative (positive) percentage change in excess capital expenditures in the following year.
After grouping observations into deciles, we calculate the median amount to subtract from discounted earnings as the median ratio of the present value of future excess capital expenditures to equity value. Equation 5 shows how this ratio is calculated:
where year zero is the year for which PVCF is calculated and the variables not previously de ned are:
CAPEX 0 = the year zero capital expenditures DEPN 0 = the year zero depreciation expense EQUITY 0 = the year zero market value of equity g = the growth rate of excess capital expenditures, set to ?4%
We set the growth rate of excess capital expenditures to a negative value because we expect the gap between capital expenditures and depreciation to shrink as earnings growth declines to its terminal rate. The median value of CAPEX ADJUST is 12%. We use increments of 2% of discounted earnings to increase the amount deducted from rms in each historical excess capital expenditures decile. Therefore, 3% of discounted earnings is subtracted from all observations in the smallest decile, and 21% is subtracted for observations in the largest decile, resulting in a median deduction of 12%.
Expenditures made to increase working capital are also not captured by earnings. The amount spent on future working capital growth depends on both the historical level of working capital and the future growth of the rm. Therefore, we adjust each future years'
earnings by a xed percentage that depends on the decile ranking of the product of expected earnings growth times the ratio of average net working capital 7 to average assets, with the averages calculated over all of the most recent three years with available information.
We calculate the median amount to subtract from discounted earnings as the median ratio of the present value of future working capital growth to equity value. Equation 6 shows 7 We de ne net working capital as current assets minus current liabilities plus short-term debt.
how this ratio is calculated:
WC ADJUST = ( .5(gr)+.5(tg)] :5 NETWC 0 ])=r EQUITY 0 (6) where the variable not previously de ned is:
NETWC 0 = the average net working capital for the three years ending in year 0
The median value of WC ADJUST is 5.5%. 8 We use increments of 1% of discounted earnings to increase the amount deducted from rms in each working capital growth decile.
Therefore, 1% of discounted earnings is subtracted from all observations in the smallest decile, and 10% is subtracted for observations in the largest decile, resulting in a median deduction of 5.5%.
Several factors potentially introduce measurement error into the PVCF proxy. Discounting future earnings using the expected return implied by the CAPM re ects each rm's systematic risk, but does not incorporate risk factors that may be omitted from the CAPM.
The optimism in analysts' forecasts is another potential source of measurement error in the PVCF proxy. 9 Measurement error is also introduced by the lack of forecast information with respect to excess capital expenditures and working capital growth. Finally, the PVCF proxy is sensitive to the assumed terminal growth rate and to the year in which terminal growth is assumed to begin.
We address the potential for measurement error in the PVCF proxy in three ways. First, we include variables in the regressions which could be correlated with the portion of true PVCF omitted from our proxy. Second, we assess the sensitivity of our results to the assumed 8 The numerator of WC ADJUST is a weighted earnings growth rate times half of average net working capital, all discounted at the expected CAPM return. The weighted earnings growth rate is the equalweighted average of the ve-year analysts' growth rate and the 4% terminal growth rate. This rate is multiplied by only half of net working capital to recognize that working capital growth may be less than earnings growth and that some of the growth in working capital is in the form of interest-bearing assets.
9 See, for example, Philbrick and Ricks (1991) , Freeman and Tse (1992) and, for a summary of the evidence, Schipper (1991). terminal growth rate, and to the year in which growth is assumed to reach its terminal rate.
None of our inferences are sensitive to changing these assumptions within reasonable ranges.
Third, we perform all of the reported tests using an alternative PVCF proxy, which is constructed by multiplying an industry-median capital-to-cash ow multiplier by the rm's cash ow. The resulting proxy is analogous to the Berger and Ofek (1995) earnings-based measure for imputing the values of segments of diversi ed rms. None of the main results is sensitive to the use of the alternative PVCF proxy.
Sample Selection and Description
We obtain data for rms covered by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) that have forecasts of earnings for at least two years ahead and forecasts of ve-year earnings growth. Each observation's rst earnings forecast must be made at least six months before the rm's scal year-end to ensure that we correctly align the year in which liquidation value is estimated from the balance sheet with the year for which PVCF is calculated. All available IBES observations with sales above $20 million, and available Compustat and CRSP data, are included in the sample. The minimum sales requirement is imposed because the PVCF proxy is likely to be less accurate for extremely small rms. Table 1 provides descriptive information on the IBES sample. Because of skewness in the distributions, we emphasize medians. Rows two through four provide information on the rst three components of PVCF, whose sum we refer to as unadjusted PVCF. For the median rm, 13% of unadjusted PVCF is due to the earnings forecast by analysts (usually for years one and two), 42% is due to the earnings projected from the time of the last analyst forecast through year ten, and 44% is due to the perpetuity calculated from year 11 forward.
The median ratio of PVCF to unadjusted PVCF is 80%, showing that the adjustments for excess capital expenditures and working capital growth reduce unadjusted PVCF by 20%. The median sample rm has xed assets equal to 34% of total assets. Less specialized assets, namely, cash, marketable securities, and receivables among current assets and land among xed assets, represent 60% of current assets and 5% of xed assets. Finally, the ratio of replacement value (see the appendix) to book value, with a median value of 1.28, is used as a control variable in the asset structure tests. Table 2 reports the results of regressions on the pooled 1984-1990 analyst forecast sample that test whether equity value is positively related to the liquidation value of net assets, after controlling for PVCF. In column one, we report the regression of equity value on PVCF and liquidation value. The variables in this speci cation are unde ated in order to provide assurance that the common de ators used in later speci cations do not a ect the inferences.
Empirical Results
Liquidation Value and Firm Value
We therefore take logs of all variables to reduce the in uence of outliers. In addition, all the table 2 regressions include xed factors for each year, whose coe cient estimates are not reported. 11 The column one results are that the coe cient estimates on both the log of PVCF and the log of liquidation value are positive and signi cant at the .001 level. 12 Theory shows that the ratio of liquidation value to PVCF, rather than liquidation value itself, is the stochastic strike price of the abandonment option. Therefore, in column two, we report the results when the log of liquidation value is replaced by excess liquidation value. The coe cient of 1.024 on the PVCF variable shows that, after controlling for the option's strike price, the market value of the rm's equity increases approximately one for one with increases in the present value of after-interest cash ows. The signi cantly positive estimate on the excess liquidation value variable continues to support the inference that the abandonment option makes a signi cant contribution to rm value beyond that made by PVCF.
In columns three and four we normalize equity value, PVCF, and liquidation value by sales in order to adjust for size di erences across observations. We continue to use no controls in column three, whereas controls are added in column four. The controls address the concern that, rather than capturing the intended economic constructs, PVCF and estimated liquidation value could merely be labels for measures that capture a single economic construct. Speci cally, if estimated liquidation value contains information about going-concern cash ows not captured by estimated PVCF, then a positive coe cient estimate on excess liquidation value may re ect the association between equity value and future cash ows rather than equity value and abandonment value. Although the control variables, the tests of the additional implications of abandonment option theory, the analysis performed in changes, and the sensitivity tests are all consistent with our measures capturing the intended economic constructs, it is impossible to completely dismiss the possibility that the liquidation 11 Throughout the paper, all regressions that pool observations across years include unreported xed factors for each year. 12 In most of the reported regressions the White test rejects the null of homoskedasticity at the .01 level. Therefore, reported signi cance levels are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
value and PVCF measures capture the same underlying construct.
The rst control variable, capital expenditures minus depreciation (scaled by assets), potentially a ects both future cash ows and estimated liquidation value (because it is a growth proxy, a source of di erence between earnings and cash ows, and is related to the vintage of the rm's tangible assets). Similarly, R&D/sales potentially a ects both future cash ows and estimated liquidation value (since R&D is a growth proxy and is not recorded as an asset for U.S. nancial reports). 13 The change in cash ow for the rst year following the observation year is used as an ex-post control for future cash ows potentially omitted from PVCF.
The coe cient estimates on the PVCF and liquidation value variables are similar without (column three) and with (column four) the inclusion of the controls. The estimates on both variables are positive and signi cant at the .001 level. To gauge the relative economic e ects of variation in PVCF and liquidation value, we multiply the estimates reported in column four for each variable by the variable's standard deviation. The results are that a one standard deviation change in PVCF/sales leads to a 0.641 change in equity value/sales, whereas for liquidation value/sales the associated change is 0.265. These results show that liquidation value has an economically signi cant e ect on equity value. The signi cantly positive estimates on all of the controls show that these variables are signi cant in controlling for growth opportunities not captured by PVCF.
In columns ve and six we present regressions whose functional form corresponds to that used in the hypothesis development. This functional form directly relates the value of the abandonment option to the option's strike price. The 0.491 coe cient estimate on excess liquidation value in column ve shows that the option's strike price is signi cantly positively related to abandonment option value. The estimate falls between the theoretical lower and upper bounds of zero and one. The adjusted R-squared of 24% indicates that the explanatory variables explain a substantial portion of the variation in abandonment option value. We add to the control variables the ratio of sales/PVCF because sales, due to its more direct link to future cash ows, is likely to capture any information about future cash ows that liquidation value captures. As in column four, all of the controls have signi cantly positive coe cient estimates.
We also performed an unreported regression like that in column ve, but with lagged excess liquidation value used in place of the contemporaneous value. Using the lagged value serves as a check against the possibility that analysts are unable to distinguish transitory from permanent earnings shocks, which could a ect the results. 14 The inferences using the lagged variable are consistent with those for the reported results. The coe cient estimate of 0.164 on lagged excess liquidation value is signi cant at better than the 0.001 level, and the adjusted R-squared of the regression is 0.170.
Measurement error is introduced into the estimated liquidation values because we apply, for each of the three asset categories, the same estimate of liquidation value per dollar of book value to all sample observations. As a sensitivity test for this concern, we use untransformed book values in column six as our measure of abandonment value. The column six results show that the inferences are not sensitive to whether total book value is used to measure abandonment value, with the coe cient estimate of 0.577 on excess book value positive and highly signi cant.
To investigate the variation over time in the relation between excess liquidation value and abandonment option value, and to address the concern that the pooled observations 14 If analyst forecasts of future earnings are too high (low) when earnings are temporarily high, our proxy assigns too high (low) a PVCF, resulting in abandonment option value being too low (high). If estimated liquidation values are more stable than earnings, excess liquidation value will also be too low (high) in the same year. Thus, transitory earnings shocks could result in a positive relation between contemporaneous excess liquidation value and abandonment option value. Using lagged excess liquidation value avoids this possibility, since current year earnings do not a ect this variable.
may not be independent because of the inclusion of the same rm for multiple years , table 3   reports the results from performing the table 2, column To further mitigate the concern that the inferences may be a ected by the liquidation value measure capturing a portion of true PVCF that is omitted from our proxy, we perform an analysis in changes. The dependent variable is the percentage change in equity value, and the independent variables are percentage changes in PVCF, liquidation value, and EBITD, as well as the level of EBITD/sales. The two EBITD variables are included as controls for changes in true PVCF omitted from the proxy measure.
The sample consists of all rst di erences of the observations from the levels analysis that meet sample selection restrictions. We require that the rst earnings forecast occur no later than the fourth month after the date liquidation value is measured, which ensures that the changes in liquidation value and PVCF are aligned correctly in time for each rm. The percentage change in equity value is meant to capture the e ect of operational decisions, not the e ects of issuances and redemptions. Therefore, we eliminate observations with issuances or retirements (see the appendix for additional details about the construction of the percentage change variables).
The results for the changes speci cation are presented in table 4. As expected, the coe cient estimate of 0.114 on the percentage change in PVCF is larger than the estimate of 0.042 on the percentage change in liquidation value. The fact that the latter estimate is signi cantly positive provides strong evidence, however, that the relation we documented earlier between liquidation value and equity value was not driven by liquidation value and the PVCF proxy both measuring di erent portions of true PVCF. The constant component of any relation between liquidation value and the omitted portion of true PVCF is eliminated by examining changes rather than levels. Therefore, continuing to nd the strong, positive relation between liquidation value and equity value in changes reinforces our con dence in the inferences from the levels analysis.
Asset structure and rm value
Theory suggests that liquidation values are closer to going-concern values for redeployable versus specialized assets. Moreover, using asset sell-o s from 157 rms, we found that the number of cents per dollar of book value produced in liquidation is higher for noninventory current assets than for either inventory or xed assets. We therefore examine the e ect of asset structure on the abandonment option's value. Table 5 reports the results of regressing abandonment option value on excess book value, several asset structure variables, the control variables, and a replacement-to-book variable. The signi cantly negative estimate, in column one, of ?0.134 on the portion of assets that are xed shows that, for a given level of excess book value, rms have less abandonment option value when more of their assets are long- Because we observe only book values (and not current values) for each asset category, the extent to which book values re ect current values could a ect the asset structure results.
Explaining these results on the basis of accounting rules is, however, very di cult. The rst result is that increasing the ratio of inventory/current assets decreases equity value.
Noninventory current assets generally have book values that approximate current values.
Thus, for accounting rules to explain the result, book value must overstate the current value of inventory (so that having a larger portion of book value in inventory would provide less current value). Generally accepted accounting principles require, however, the use of the lower-of-cost-or-market basis for most inventory reporting purposes. 15 This method results in book values never overstating current values for inventory. Similarly, for accounting rules to explain the negative estimate on the portion of assets that are xed, book value must overstate the current value of xed assets more than current assets. Book value's re ection of current value is likely similar, however, between xed and current assets. 16 Thus, the only asset structure variable whose results could plausibly be a ected by accounting rules is Land/ xed assets. It is plausible, though not necessarily likely, that the ratio of book value to current value is higher for non-land xed assets than for land.
To address potential concerns about book values being used to proxy current values, we control for variation in the ratio of replacement-to-book value. Such variation can arise from di erences in asset structure and vintage. For example, a rm with mainly old, xed assets could have a higher book value, but a lower current asset value, than a rm with mainly liquid assets. The replacement-to-book variable controls for this concern because replacement value is calculated with an algorithm that adjusts assets for in ation based on asset age (see the appendix). Controlling for in ation's e ect with the replacement-to-book variable in column two does not a ect the inferences from the asset structure variables.
This result increases our con dence that the asset structure results re ect, at least in part, investors' expectation that more specialized assets will produce less abandonment value per dollar of current value.
4.3 The abandonment option's sensitivity to nancial distress likelihood and agency con icts Abandonment option theory shows that market value is more sensitive to variation in liquidation value when the probability of the option being exercised is higher. For given levels of PVCF and liquidation value, one factor that could increase the probability of abandonment is nancial distress likelihood. We therefore examine whether, all else equal, abandonment option value is more sensitive to variation in excess liquidation value for rms with higher probabilities of experiencing nancial distress. Table 6 presents the results of regressing abandonment option value on excess liquidation value, the controls, and a variable that interacts excess liquidation value with the probability of nancial distress. In column one, the interactive variable is multiplicative, and the probability of nancial distress is measured as the inverse of the Altman (1968) Z-score. 17 In column two, the interactive variable is an indicator set equal to excess liquidation value for rms with a Z-score in the bottom quartile of the sample, and to zero otherwise. The sample for both regressions includes all obser- The results show that a given excess liquidation value is valued more highly when the likelihood of experiencing nancial distress is high. The coe cient estimates on the interactive indicators are signi cantly positive in column one (.01 level) and column two (.05 level). A concern we have with the table 6 tests is that rms with higher nancial distress probabilities are likely to have higher nancial distress costs, and these costs will tend to be omitted from the PVCF estimate because analysts are forecasting going concern earnings. Therefore, the reported results could be sensitive to the assumptions used to calculate PVCF.
We have performed sensitivity tests to assess this concern, and we nd that the magnitude and signi cance of the coe cient estimates on the interactive indicators are sensitive to the assumptions used to calculate PVCF. The reported results are thus fragile and should be interpreted with caution.
The probability of abandonment may also increase when agency con icts between owners and managers are reduced. To investigate the importance of agency problems to holders of the abandonment option, we test whether a given excess liquidation value is associated with more option value when there is a higher probability that managers will liquidate at the time investors desire. We assume rational expectations, and therefore use the ex-post exercise of the abandonment option through a partial liquidation as an indicator of a higher ex-ante probability of timely exercise. Table 7 presents three regressions of abandonment option value on excess liquidation value, the controls, and an interactive indicator set equal to excess liquidation value for rms that subsequently had a liquidation and to zero otherwise. The three regressions in table 7 di er in their de nition of partial liquidation. The rst regression de nes partial liquidation as having an asset sale of at least $100 million, the second as having a one-time dividend equal to at least 10% of equity value, and the third as either of these two events.
The sample used for these regressions includes 1986 observations only. We use 1986 as the base year in order to facilitate searching forward for partial liquidations. The subsample used for the rst and third regressions includes only those 1986 observations with a market value of equity of at least $1 billion. We impose the market value of equity requirement because our sample of large asset sales is drawn from the John and Ofek (1995) sample and includes only sales of at least $100 million. Therefore, we restrict the sample to rms large enough to realistically contemplate a partial liquidation of at least $100 million.
The coe cient estimates on the interactive indicators are signi cantly positive (.01 level) in all three regressions, indicating that an extra dollar of liquidation value is more highly valued when partial liquidation is about to occur. The results are thus consistent with some managers delaying abandonment beyond the optimal time for investors.
The tests reported in table 7 do not distinguish liquidations forced after an unforeseen (in 1986) change in either the principal-agent contract or the likelihood of nancial distress from voluntary dispositions. Such unforeseen forced liquidations may be inconsistent with the spirit of the analysis, however, because they could occur in situations where agency con icts were high during 1986. Therefore, we searched the Wall Street Journal Index for any changes in management or corporate governance occurring between 1986 and the liquidation date as the result of a takeover, a proxy contest, or CEO turnover. We also examined whether the Altman (1968) Z-score declined below zz during the same period. We identi ed x (y) cases of such presumably unforeseen changes in agency problems (distress probability) within the asset sale sample. The reported results are not sensitive to excluding these observations.
Sensitivity tests
We assess the sensitivity of the reported results to the calculation of PVCF by performing regressions in which PVCF is calculated under alternative assumptions. We vary PVCF along three dimensions. The rst dimension is whether or not PVCF is adjusted for excess capital expenditures and working capital growth. The second dimension is the terminal growth rate, and the third is the year in which growth is assumed to reach its terminal rate. Table 8 provides descriptive information on how excess equity value, the dependent variable in the sensitivity regressions, is a ected by varying the PVCF calculation along each of the three dimensions. The table's rst row reports information for the version of PVCF used in the reported results (i.e., with adjustment for excess capital expenditures and working capital growth, using a 4% terminal growth rate, and assuming the terminal growth rate begins in year 11). The median abandonment option value is 0.115. The remaining rows describe what happens to abandonment option value when one dimension of the PVCF calculation is changed from that used in the reported results. When no adjustment is made to PVCF for excess capital expenditures and working capital growth, PVCF is increased and the median abandonment option value is lowered to ?0.104. The same e ect occurs if the assumed rate of terminal growth is increased, or if the year in which terminal growth starts is postponed. Thus, the median abandonment option value falls from 0.223 with 0% terminal growth to ?0.011 with 6% terminal growth; and from 0.333 when terminal growth starts in year six to ?0.142 when it starts in year 21. Table 9 presents the sensitivity regressions. It is readily apparent that varying the assumptions used in calculating PVCF has little e ect on the inference from the excess liquidation value variable. The column with terminal growth starting in year 11 is the original result, which was presented in column ve of table 2. The estimate on excess liquidation value is between 0.4 and 0.5, and is signi cant at the .001 level. The same is also true in each of the seven sensitivity regressions. Moreover, as either the rate of terminal growth or its starting year are increased, no trend is evident in the magnitude of the coe cient estimate on excess liquidation value. The estimate decreases from 0.494 to 0.479 as the terminal growth rate is increased from 0% to 2%, but it then increases when terminal growth is raised to 4% (the original results) and decreases again when the growth rate is changed to 6%.
Similarly, the estimate on excess liquidation value is greater when terminal growth begins in year 11 instead of year six, but thereafter it becomes smaller as the starting year for terminal growth is increased. With respect to the control variables, the striking pattern is that the estimates on the controls generally become smaller as the year of starting terminal growth is increased. Thus, extending rm-speci c growth out farther in time appears to reduce the extent to which growth opportunities are omitted from the PVCF proxy. Overall, the sensitivity regressions provide strong evidence that our inferences are not a ected by changing, within reasonable ranges, the assumptions used to calculate PVCF.
Conclusions
Investors in a rm have the option, as uncertainty about future cash ows is resolved, to abandon the rm for its liquidation value. Theory suggests that this option is priced as an American put, whose value is increasing in liquidation value. We estimate liquidation value based on the relation between book value and liquidation value for major asset classes, as disclosed by rms with su ciently detailed discontinued operations footnotes. We measure abandonment option value as the percentage by which equity value exceeds going concern after-interest cash ows. The present value of these cash ows is calculated using analysts' earnings forecasts. Speci c earnings forecasts are discounted and summed, earnings for the period from the last forecast through year ten are projected based on analysts' consensus earnings growth forecast, and a perpetuity for the earnings from year 11 forward is added by assuming a constant 4% nominal terminal growth rate applies for all observations. The present value of future earnings is then adjusted to arrive at the present value of future cash ows distributable to equity holders. Adjustments are made for the present value of future capital expenditures minus future depreciation and for the present value of working capital growth. We nd a positive and highly signi cant relation between market value and estimated liquidation value after controlling for the value of future cash ows. This relation holds in levels, in changes, and for various methods of estimating the value of future cash ows.
Option pricing theory suggests that if future cash ows become disappointing, the value of the rm's generalizable assets will not decline as much as the value of its specialized assets. We therefore investigate whether more generalizable assets produce more abandonment option value. We nd that a given amount of book value has a more positive e ect on market value when more of the book value derives from certain categories of assets. These results are consistent with assets producing more abandonment value when they are more generalizable.
In addition to depending on the ratio of liquidation value to PVCF, the probability of the abandonment option's exercise is posited to depend on the rm's likelihood of experiencing nancial distress and on the level of agency problems between the rm's investors and its managers. Abandonment put option theory predicts that market value will be more sensitive to variation in liquidation value when the probability of the option being exercised is higher.
We nd support for the prediction that an extra dollar of liquidation value is more highly valued when the likelihood of experiencing nancial distress is higher, although this result is sensitive to the assumptions made in controlling for future cash ows. In addition, tests using a subsample of rms that had partial liquidations support the hypothesis that investors attach more value to the abandonment option when the probability of timely liquidation by the manager is higher. Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) , assumed to be zero. Speci cally, we assume that the value of plant in 1970 (or the rst year with available Compustat data) is equal to book value. Following Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall, we reduce the value of plant and equipment by 5% each year to compensate for depreciation and then adjust it for in ation using the GNP de ator. We then apply the Lindenberg and Ross formula. For inventories, we apply the Lindenberg and Ross algorithm directly.
Appendix
